Thank you.

Thank you.

For sure climate change – both a general interest in mitigation and a more particular concern about the effects of climate instability on one’s personal life and livelihood – can have and have had a mobilisation effect in a variety of countries, some organised more democratically than others. The sceptics and those whose interests dictate opposition to radical action on climate change have also been mobilised. While the lessons for global governance are ambiguous, you are right to draw attention to the greater potential for subjecting technocratic processes to close scrutiny and control in democracies compared to non-democracies.

The observation that the best that Western democracies can do to promote democracy abroad may be their domestic credibility and performance regarding dramatic challenges like climate change is thought–provoking. Perhaps the reverse could also be said: the best chance for an adequate response to climate change by governments everywhere, irrespective of the type of political regime, is for the world’s main established democracies to (continue) to be seen to take a strong lead in their domestic response to climate change, most notably by implementing ambitious targets for reducing emissions. The thought that this domestic effort could serve to promote both democracy and robust climate action around the world is very appealing.

Thank you.

Thank you

Yes, the paper does not offer an account of the ‘dominant and destructive model of development’ and more specifically the role of the market. This is a separate and huge and relevant debate – relevant to both climate change and to democracy and democratisation as well as to the relationships among these. As such it is worthy of many substantial papers in its own right. You are right to call for more study of the political economy of climate change, although I think the existence of politically influential industrial interest opposed to climate action is mentioned in the paper – but, like so much else, could be only be raised very briefly. The whole issue of democracy/democratisation beyond the formally recognised political sphere also extends the debate in directions the paper could not cover, and where others have much to contribute. But it does not necessarily mean that the conventional distinctions of autocracy, hybrid (or intermediate) regimes and liberal and electoral democracies makes no difference to political practice in the real world.

And yes, obviously humankind must move away from a ‘fossilist’ mode of production, and the question of how this can happen is much more than an issue of what new technologies are available.

The impact of globalisation on the state and on the outlook for democracy at the level of the national state is another of those huge debates (or, rather, two debates) where different opinions and points of view can be found. I am not familiar with every contribution, but clearly should investigate the items mentioned in the comments.

Thank you.

I agree with your observation that a key question is over which kinds of political system or regime are best equipped to make an effective response to the challenges posed by climate change, and that there may be no simple and obvious and indisputable answer. Future studies should indeed investigate the patters and think hard about the reasons behind any correlations, including discrepancies between different models of democracy and their institutional architectures as well as discrepancies with political systems that do not qualify as stable liberal democracies and the discrepancies among different authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes. I agree that this is a research agenda that should be pursued more than it has been so far. I also agree that the countries in political transition may be at a disadvantage in addressing climate change, that governance capacity and democracy are not the same thing (and do not always co-vary) and that this is relevant both to addressing climate change and to international efforts to change the way some countries govern themselves.

In regard to the idea of ‘autocracy promotion’ that you mention, a recent discussion can be found in Working Paper 96 (March 2010) titled ‘Is there a new autocracy promotion?, published electronically and in paper form by FRIDE, Madrid. Further material on this is awaiting publication but can be shared sooner on demand. The question you raise about the possibility of a triple gain from international cooperation involving mutually-reinforcing progress on democracy, governance and climate mitigation and adaptation together is enormously important and worthy of careful consideration. I suspect you are right, however, to raise the possibility of ‘overload’ in the portfolio of emerging democracies, and I would add that the likelihood of ‘overload’ – or bureaucratic resistance – in the portfolio of the international development cooperation and other international agencies could be just as great.

Finally, because the debate on climate change has up until now been dominated by the international dimensions the paper quite deliberately chose to concentrate mainly on the national level. One point that has come out of the disappointments widely expressed over Copenhagen (see my attachment Has Copenhagen and the aftermath made a difference?) is that perhaps binding international agreements do not offer the way forward. The suggestion is that we should look more closely at what states and bodies like the EU are actually doing, or not doing. Put differently, maybe China is now taking considerable steps in practice – and much more so than India – even if neither country is prepared to sign up to a binding international agreement on targets to reduce all greenhouse gas emissions. So perhaps all is not lost, or not yet! But how climate change and energy security will impact on democracy promotion priorities and strategies can only speculated; and whether and how they should impact is a matter for organisations like the Foundation to determine for themselves.

Thank you.

Saudi Arabia is neither a democracy nor a very liberal polity, according to most political commentators. Perhaps there is a misunderstanding of the wording in the paper that thinks it call Saudi a democracy but not a liberal democracy – a claim that I would not agree with.

I agree with the importance of distinguishing between the effects of climate change on political variables and the political effects of measures to combat climate change. If the sum total of our knowledge on this, after incorporating economic performance, climate refugees etc is ‘meagre’, then that is a sad but perhaps well justified reflection on social science’s inability to pose the right questions and devise methodologically sound ways of procuring convincing answers. Contestation of the evidence, of the methods, of the conceptual constructs even, is rife. And as you rightly say, the evidence base is a moving target but still very incomplete. Maybe all this tells us something about the subjects under investigation – their complexity and immensity – as well as about the discipline(s).

The obligations to engage in favour of both strong mitigation and prudent mitigation are compelling, in my view, and I do not think the paper says otherwise. Indeed, the lengthy penultimate paragraph of the commentary sums up admirably many of the points the paper tries to raise. And it seems to me there are both moral dilemmas right now and also the possibility – some would say the certainty – of even more and bigger dilemmas in the future if humankind does not get its act together pretty soon. How do ethicists trade off present day and likely future moral dilemmas?

Thank you.

I agree with the importance of investing in renewable energies and energy efficiency, where China is very active – more so than many democracies who appear to have been held back by the recent financial and economic crisis.

The statistical study by Neumayer (included in the References) found that democracies exhibit stronger international environmental commitment than non-democracies, in the sense of signing and ratifying multilateral environmental agreements, but the evidence in respect of the actual outcomes is very much weaker. This may be because the signatories do not fully deliver on their promises (which seems to be the case with then Kyoto Protocol and also the UN’s 2002 Convention on Biological Diversity, where the UN now acknowledges that the agreement has completely failed to reverse accelerating loss of biodiversity around the world). The more recent empirical study by Bättig and Bernauer (2009, also referenced in the paper) appears to confirm what Neumayer found out earlier, and has been cited by the World Bank.

Yes, greenhouse gas reductions and reductions in social inequality can be made compatible, if the right choice of measures is adopted. The political economy of development could shed light on whether the right choices will be made, or not made, in particular states.

Yes, I agree that active participation by the people might be a necessary condition for some approaches/measures in climate adaptation to succeed. But it might not be essential to the success of all the possible approaches/measures, where technical, managerial and professional competence could be more important to a functioning solution, or where immediate and decisive action is required. The more examples of a win-win situation between development, climate adaptation and democratization that you/we can think of, the better. Building up knowledge on this should certainly be a focus of attention for future work by organisations like the Foundation, in my opinion.

I agree that the real challenge is to promote democracy in an adequate way which takes into account the overriding importance of climate related policies. This is absolutely crucial. Another big task for the Foundation!

On the increasing awareness of the need to take into account climate adaptation as a cross-cutting issue, I am sure you are right. More evidence of that awareness translating into actual changes of strategy and policy towards international development cooperation by the global universe of relevant agencies would be welcome.

The still emerging funding Mechanism certainly merits attention, but any kind of assessment just yet would be premature.

Thank you.

If the evidence showed that non-democratic regimes are more effective than non-democracies at combating climate change, and if the challenge of combating climate change is very urgent, then society must decide for itself, in the light its own values, on how to prioritise the democracy promotion (where democratic change is known to be hazardous) and combating climate change. My guess is that the people of China- and there are many of them – probably have a different take on this compared to people in Germany or the UK for instance. The line in the comment commencing ‘The implicit policy advice etc’ is not one that I recognise from the paper, and not one that I would identify with. Maybe the paper’s intentions were not communicated very well.

The paper’s statement that non-democracies are said to rely more heavily on their ability to perform is an accurate representation of the democratization literature. However, note that the claim is not a descriptive statement that all really existing non-democracies actually do perform well and do gain popular support or legitimacy as a consequence. Instead it is a statement that in principle non-democracies have nothing else to rely on if they want to enjoy the support of their people and establish a claim to legitimacy in the people’s eyes, given that popular consent expressed via free and fair competitive elections is not allowed and the use of forcer or the threat of force to coerce obedience hardly count. While the central proposition is contestable in theory (there may be other foundations of support rooted in nationalist and anti-imperialist ideology or religious belief, for example) the reality is that some regimes that are not recognised as liberal democracies do seem to enjoy at least the acquiescence of the people, because the regimes deliver security and prosperity. Singapore is often cited as an example. Of course none of this means that such regimes are bound to be committed to environmental sustainability.

The paper’s terms of reference did not include exploring ‘whether economic development and mitigating climate change must be outplayed against one another’, although it raises this as one possibility. My impression is that this is a hotly contested area in political debate. Developing countries certainly do have an opportunity to avoid making the mistakes that have been made by the so-called advanced industrial economies during their industrial development. But for many of them the ability to do this requires financial and technical support from the international community. The paper makes this point, and you are right to draw attention to it.

The observation that ‘It is not democracy as such that has historically led to an increase in CO2 emissions, but the wrong economic models and instruments etc’ is extremely significant and most pertinent. I am not confident that causal responsibility can be laid at the door of just one ‘independent variable’. Politics matters; and although it is true that the communist countries had a generally poorer environmental record than other countries it is non-communist countries that have been mainly responsible for the historical accumulation of carbon emissions, up till now (albeit not being aware of the consequences until fairly recently).

The ‘huge task that lies before us – …to strive for a triple win situation where development, climate action and democratization’ all occur is indeed extremely important, as other commentators on the paper have drawn attention to as well. In my opinion it merits much more intensive investigation than it has had from anyone so far. It would be great if organisations like the Heinrich Böll Foundation now focus their energy on thinking through how to turn the idea of a ‘triple win’ into reality. As other commentators have pointed out to, it probably requires both interdisciplinarity and constructive collaboration among policy-makers, politicians and other interested parties.

The importance of helping developing countries to develop in ways that tackle both poverty and climate is undeniable, not least because mitigation there can reduce the chances of political as well as humanitarian and economic disasters occurring there in the future. For sure the current financial proposals are simply not enough to do that.

The incentive of non-democratic countries with a small ruling elite to tackle climate change poses a very good question. We might equally ask why China appears to be taking more dramatic steps now than many western democracies? And also what kind of democracy will give more weight to the incentive to prioritise climate mitigation (and help poor countries with their mitigation and adaptation), if the majority of the people in a wealthy democracy determines that it is not their priority, and if vested interests opposed to climate action use the legal and legitimate measure that democracy allows to sway public opinion and influence legislators in directions that to satisfy their sectional, or particular interests at the expense of sane action on climate change?

Finally, the paper does indeed raise the possibility that a non-democratic system – or, more accurately, a system trying to move from a more authoritarian to a less authoritarian system and perhaps encountering difficulties in maintaining political stability and effective governance along the way (e.g, Russia in the 1990s) – could deal better with fighting climate change. It is much less confident that it would do better. And there is no evidence that it would compare favourably against those relatively few democracies that, unlike the majority, have taken a clear and strong lead on climate change.

The ‘correct question’ – ‘how can we succeed in convincing society of the urgency and need of combating climate change and the necessary changes in our way of life. How can we design a democratic system that is capable of counteracting the massive influence by powerful corporations that distort the will of the people just because they have enormous resources at hand’ are incredibly important, even if they are not the only questions that could be asked and that demand plausible answers. It is heartening to see there are politicians and civil society activists who are committed to taking on the challenge. Why are there not so many more? And why is there still a mountain to climb, notwithstanding the compelling evidence for addressing climate change forcefully and as a matter of urgency. Far from being not ‘correct’ these questions pose conundrums that also merit further consideration.

Thank you.